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Constructive Trust Claims: Enforcing a Parent’s Broken Promise to Leave Half the Estate to the Kids

Divorce settlements often include promises about what happens to the family’s money long after the divorce. A parent agrees to leave part of the estate to the kids from the first marriage. Then life moves on. The parent remarries, puts the house and the bank accounts in joint names with the new spouse, and signs a will that leaves everything to the new spouse. The kids find out after the funeral that almost nothing is left in Dad’s name.

Can the kids do anything about it? The promise was made decades ago, the property passed outside of probate, and the new spouse never signed anything. The answer often turns on a remedy called a constructive trust.

In Crain v. Crain, 72 F.4th 269, No. 22-1674 (8th Cir. June 23, 2023), a federal appeals court upheld a constructive trust over nearly $100 million in property held by a surviving second wife. The case was decided under Arkansas law, not Texas law. But the questions the court had to answer come up in Texas blended-family estate fights all the time: what does “estate” mean in a divorce settlement, can joint ownership be used to get around the promise, and can a court take property back from a spouse who did nothing wrong?

Facts & Procedural History

H.C. “Dude” Crain, Jr. married Marillyn Crain in 1954. In 1960, they and Dude’s parents founded Crain Sales Company, which made foam products. Both Dude and Marillyn helped build it. The company, later renamed Crain Industries, became one of the largest private companies in Arkansas and reportedly earned $154 million in revenue in 1990. Dude and Marillyn had four children: Lisa Crain, Cathee Crain, Marillyn Crain Brody, and Kristan Snell.

Dude and Marillyn separated by 1976. Dude started dating Shirley in 1984 and filed for divorce in the Logan County, Arkansas Chancery Court in 1988. Both sides had lawyers, and they signed a property settlement agreement. Dude kept most of the property, including the entire company. Marillyn took the house (and its debt), her Mercedes, some personal property, her bank accounts, a $250,000 payment, and a $1.5 million annuity.

The agreement also had what the court called the “Will Provision.” Dude and Marillyn each agreed to “maintain in full force and [e]ffect a valid Last Will and Testament whereby each will leave at least one-half of their estate” to the four children, per stirpes. The divorce court declared the agreement “contractual and nonmodifiable” and incorporated it into the final decree. Months later, Dude married Shirley.

Dude and Shirley owned almost everything jointly: real estate, bank accounts, investments, and several businesses in Northwest Arkansas. Much of that wealth came from Dude’s 1995 sale of Crain Industries for $130 million. The couple was generous with the children, including Christmas gifts of $1.6 million each in 2012 that were understood as “advances on their inheritance.”

But Dude never kept his promise. His 1993 will left everything to Shirley and nothing to the children. A 2012 will was supposed to put his separate property into two trusts. One trust would benefit the four children and Shirley’s son. The other, much larger trust would benefit Shirley alone during her life, with the children and her son as remainder beneficiaries, and Shirley could pay herself as much of it as she wanted. A codicil signed shortly afterward eliminated per stirpes inheritance.

Dude suffered a serious head injury in a fall in 2014 and died in 2017. Nobody opened a probate case. Shirley never set up the trusts. She took Dude’s separate property, and the jointly owned property passed to her by operation of Arkansas law.

In March 2020, almost three years after Dude died, the children opened an estate administration in Sebastian County, Arkansas. Shirley first said the 1993 will controlled, then offered the 2012 will, which the probate court admitted. Days after opening the probate case, the children, who live in Texas, sued Shirley and Dude’s estate in federal court in Arkansas. They claimed they were third-party beneficiaries of Dude’s promise to their mother, and they asked for specific performance and a constructive trust on at least half of everything Dude owned right before he died.

The trial court ruled on summary judgment that Dude breached the agreement. The hard part was the remedy. As the trial court put it, “the vast majority of the assets [Dude] enjoyed and controlled during the last two decades of his life were jointly owned with Shirley, either in tenancies by the entirety or in joint tenancies with right of survivorship.” Shirley had also sold or exchanged some of the assets after Dude died. After a three-day bench trial, the court traced and valued the assets, gave Shirley “an equitable right to ownership of 10%” of certain assets for her role in building the couple’s wealth, split most of the rest down the middle, and imposed a constructive trust on nearly $100 million in property. Shirley appealed.

So the appeal came down to two questions. Did “estate” mean only what would pass through probate, or everything Dude owned? And if Dude broke his promise, could the court take property away from Shirley, who never signed the agreement?

How Contracts to Make a Will and Joint Property Work in Texas

To understand why this kind of promise matters, we first have to look at how Texas treats contracts about wills and how property passes outside of a will.

Texas enforces contracts to make a will, or not to revoke one, but it is strict about proof. Under Section 254.004(a) of the Texas Estates Code, a contract like this “may be established only by” (1) “a written agreement that is binding and enforceable,” or (2) a will stating “that a contract exists” and “the material provisions of the contract.” Section 254.004(b) adds that signing a joint will or reciprocal wills “does not constitute by itself sufficient evidence of the existence of a contract.” In plain terms, an oral promise or a family understanding is not enough. You need it in writing.

A divorce settlement can meet that requirement. Under Section 7.006 of the Texas Family Code, divorcing spouses may enter into a written agreement dividing their property, and if the court approves it, the court “may set forth the agreement in full or incorporate the agreement by reference in the final decree.” A promise in that agreement to leave property to the children is a written promise, just like the Will Provision in Crain.

The problem is that a will only controls property that passes through probate. Property with a right of survivorship goes straight to the surviving owner at death. In Texas, joint owners can create a right of survivorship by agreeing in writing under Section 111.001 of the Estates Code, but that agreement “may not be inferred from the mere fact that property is held in joint ownership.” Spouses can also agree that community property will pass to the survivor, but under Section 112.052(a) that agreement “must be in writing and signed by both spouses.” Once a valid survivorship agreement is in place, that property skips the will entirely.

That is the gap a remarried parent can use, intentionally or not. If everything is titled with survivorship rights in favor of the new spouse, the “estate” that passes under the will may be close to nothing. Half of nothing is nothing. A constructive trust is how courts close that gap. It is an equitable remedy: the court declares that the person holding legal title to the property holds it for someone else and must hand it over, because keeping it would unjustly enrich them.

How the Court Analyzed the Broken Promise

Before reaching the merits, the court dealt with Shirley’s argument that a federal court had no business in a probate and divorce dispute. The court disagreed. Under Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), the probate exception only keeps federal courts from probating or annulling a will, administering an estate, or disposing of property in the custody of a state probate court. The trial court never touched the property in the Arkansas probate case. It only declared the parties’ rights. And this was not a divorce case between feuding spouses. Both Dude and Marillyn were dead. The court treated it as a third-party beneficiary contract claim, relying on its earlier decision in Lannan v. Maul, 979 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1992), where an ex-husband broke a promise in a divorce settlement to keep his daughter as beneficiary of a life insurance policy.

“Estate” meant everything Dude owned. Shirley argued that “estate” meant only the probate estate, since the promise was about keeping a will. The court admitted the word “estate,” standing alone, is ambiguous. But the same agreement used the word more broadly a few paragraphs later, stating that “all personal property of every kind and nature now in possession of each party shall, except as provided herein be his or her sole estate, free and clear of all claims or demands of the other.” The court presumed the parties used the word the same way throughout.

The context pointed the same way. Marillyn walked away from a business that Dude later sold, netting about $84 million, and took a much smaller share. Both sides had lawyers, so the court concluded she gave up her share for the children’s benefit. And Shirley’s reading made the promise pointless: “If estate had such a meaning, then Dude could easily circumvent the Will Provision.”

Shirley also argued that this reading would stop people in Dude’s position from ever owning property jointly. The court said the Arkansas Supreme Court had already rejected that argument decades ago in Janes v. Rogers, 271 S.W.2d 930 (Ark. 1954), holding that a contract to make a will “is applicable to property held by the spouses in an estate by the entirety, even though it would not pass under the will of either spouse but would devolve on the surviving spouse by operation of law.” Dude could do whatever he wanted with half his property, including owning it jointly with Shirley. But the other half “was subject to and encumbered by the superior contractual rights of [his four] children,” in the words of another Arkansas Supreme Court decision the court quoted. Dude breached the agreement when he failed to leave them half.

A constructive trust was the right fix. The trial court had ordered specific performance of Dude’s promise, but by the time the children sued, much of the property had been sold or exchanged. The court of appeals agreed that a constructive trust was the right way to carry out the promise. Under Janes, specific performance is the proper remedy for breach of a contract to make a will, and the beneficiary’s rights beat the rights of a joint tenant who takes the property by operation of law. And under Cox v. Miller, 210 S.W.3d 842 (Ark. 2005), a constructive trust is appropriate “where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that [s]he would be unjustly enriched if [s]he were permitted to retain it.”

Shirley argued that Arkansas does not allow unjust enrichment remedies in contract cases. The court explained why that did not help her: the children had a contract with Dude, not with Shirley. “The district court did not encumber these assets with a constructive trust because Shirley breached the [settlement agreement]; rather, it did so because Dude breached the agreement and thereby unjustly enriched Shirley at [the children’s] expense.”

The court found an almost identical case in Orsini v. Commercial National Bank, 639 S.W.2d 516 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982). There, a divorced father agreed to keep his daughter as beneficiary of a life insurance policy, then named his new wife instead. The Arkansas Court of Appeals upheld a constructive trust on the proceeds for the daughter, even without fraud or a confidential relationship. The same logic applied to Shirley, even though she did nothing wrong. As Orsini put it, “Innocent parties may frequently be unjustly enriched.”

That same point decided Shirley’s standing argument. She claimed the children’s injury came from Dude, not her. The court said the injury was traceable to Shirley because she held the property that belonged to the children and kept withholding it in violation of her equitable duty to convey it to them.

Finally, the court upheld how the trial court divided the property. The trial court gave Shirley the 10% share of the jointly owned property, gave the children no additional interest in a business they already owned half of, and treated certain real properties as Shirley’s alone because she built or created them. The court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed.

The Takeaway

Crain shows that a promise in a divorce settlement to leave property to the children can outlast decades of remarriage, joint accounts, and new wills. Putting property in joint names did not defeat the promise, and the court used a constructive trust to take property back from a second wife who never signed the agreement and did nothing wrong.

Crain is an Arkansas case, and a Texas court would apply Texas law. A Texas claim would start with Section 254.004: the promise has to be in a binding written agreement or stated in a will. A divorce settlement can satisfy that. The fight will then likely be over what the agreement means. If you are negotiating a divorce settlement that includes a promise to leave property to the children, define “estate.” Say whether it includes jointly owned property, survivorship accounts, life insurance, retirement accounts, and property acquired after the divorce. That one definition is what the Crain family litigated over for years.

If you are one of the children, don’t wait. The Crain children waited almost three years after their father died to sue, and by then some of the property had been sold or exchanged. That made the remedy harder to carry out. Get a copy of the divorce decree and the settlement agreement, find out how the assets were titled, and talk to a probate litigation attorney about your deadlines. And if you are the surviving spouse, know that property that passed to you outside of probate can still be reached if it was already promised to someone else.

Our Houston Probate Attorneys provide a full range of probate services to our clients, including helping with contracts to make a will, constructive trust claims, and inheritance disputes in blended families. Affordable rates, fixed fees, and payment plans are available. We provide step-by-step instructions, guidance, checklists, and more for completing the probate process. We have years of combined experience that we can use to support and guide you with probate and estate matters. Call us today for a FREE consultation.

Disclaimer 

The content of this website is for informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice. The information presented may not apply to your situation and should not be acted upon without consulting a qualified probate attorney. We encourage you to seek the advice of a competent attorney with any legal questions you may have.

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